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Abstract:  
 
The defence industries in France and elsewhere have, in recent years, undergone important 
technological, organizational and institutional changes that have profoundly altered their 
architectures. These changes have introduced a new division of labour bringing new 
opportunities for interaction leading to the creation of additional assets. In this context, the 
issue of protecting innovations and their exploitation has become central. Managing 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) requires industrial groups to draw on additional 
capabilities. This article analyzes these evolutions and focuses in particular on the new 
organizational arrangements that have accompanied them. Using the case of Thales, which in 
2005 outsourced its Intellectual Property (IP), we answer questions such as: why should IP be 
outsourced; how should the outsourcing of IP activities be organized; and, how should 
capabilities involved in this new organizational arrangement be managed. These issues lie at 
the centre of this research and illustrate new challenges inherent to in-house and outsourced 
IPR management strategies. 
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1- INTRODUCTION 
The issue of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) is increasingly important in the business 
sphere and in academic literature. This paper aims to contribute to this literature by focusing 
on the outsourcing of IPR activities. Until the mid-1990s, non-legal literature on IPR was 
limited both in scope and quantity (Hanel, 2006). The increasing interest in IPR is directly 
linked to the rise in patent applications during the 1990s, generally described as a patent surge 
(Neuhäusler, 2012). This is characteristic of intellectual capitalism, which results from the 
combination of a capitalist economy and a knowledge economy in which intellectual capital 
plays a major role and is considered as the principal economic asset (Granstrand, 2000). Over 
recent years, IPR management has become the cornerstone of corporate strategy and firms’ 
competitive positioning (Hanel, 2006). Numerous studies have analyzed the reasons for this 
patent surge by outlining the various uses of patents (Blind et al., 2006). The first of these is 
obviously to protect the revenue from specific inventions. Recent research by Goldenberg and 
Linton (2012) refers to the compound option approach, which assesses the value associated 
with this primary motive to patent. From that perspective, a patent is primarily considered as 
an option to sue, “which in turn is an option to collect cash flows associated to winning the 
legal suit” (ibid, 181). But as mentioned by the authors, patents may offer other benefits, such 
as IP blockades, an extended market, increased reputation, exchanges and licensing potential. 
Often mentioned as Strategic Patenting, these alternative uses of patents are clearly 
responsible for the increase in applications and non-legal literature’s interest in patents 
(Granstrand 2000; Hanel, 2006). For example, thanks to a textual analysis of the papers 
published in Technovation during 2009 and 2010, Linton (2011) points out that patents 
feature among the most frequently occurring terms (along with funding, absorptive capacity 
and alliance). More broadly, Candelin-Plamqvist et al. (2012) analyzed IPR articles published 
from 1970-2009 in the leading journals focusing on innovation management (the journal 
selection is based on Linton and Embrechts, 2007). This is the first study that systematically 
analyzes IPR research over a long period. As mentioned by the authors, it outlines the main 
trends in the fast-growing research field of IPR and enables researchers to position their 
studies better in terms of both method and content. Referring to this state of the art, our 
present research contributes to IPR literature in two ways.  
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First, regarding methods, Candelin-Plamqvist et al. (2012) highlight the lack of recent studies 
at firm level. The authors mention that almost 90% of published studies have focused on 
macro-level and secondary data, and encourage new longitudinal and firm-level analysis that 
“may provide more feasible implications for innovation-management practitioners working 
on the organisational level” (2012, 508). They also call for more qualitative studies to answer 
how and why questions related to IPR issues. In the same vein, in his recent literature review 
on patent strategy, Somaya (2012) encourages case study research in order to improve the 
understanding of processes and mechanisms by which firms develop sophisticated patent 
management capabilities. In this context, our article tries to fill this gap by scrutinizing the 
organizational devices that accompany innovative firms. Based on a case study, we study the 
outsourcing of intellectual property (IP) and its implications for IPR management.  
 
Secondly, regarding content, only very few studies have specifically focused on the question 
of organizing protection. The work done by Granstrand (1999), which constitutes an 
invaluable reference in the matter, only provides a very succinct treatment of outsourcing. 
Literature on IPR management has only recently specifically focused on outsourcing. Three 
major studies should be mentioned here: Reitzig and Wagner (2010), Mayer et al. (2012) and 
Moeen et al. (2013). These research studies are based on quantitative analyses and centre on 
the outsourcing of patent prosecution (activities related to filing and obtaining patents). They 
study the development of various types of human capital and their impact on outsourcing 
(Mayer et al., 2012), the hidden costs of outsourcing (Reitzig and Wagner, 2010) and the 
factors that influence the concentration of a firm’s supply portfolio (Moeen et al., 2013). This 
present paper fits in with these recent published studies but takes a different methodological 
slant with a focus on firm level, thus aiming to gain a deeper understanding of how firms can 
organize themselves to manage their IPR. More specifically, it is based on an analysis of 
outsourcing, a kind of organizational arrangement that has been little explored in literature on 
IP management. 
 
An analysis of the case of Thales, a French group in the defence industry that in 2005 opted to 
hand over the running of its IP to an external firm, provides a significant illustration. It offers 
a unique insight into an emerging model of IPR management. In France, new forms of 
governance and a new division of labour in the defence industry have led to the development 
of in-house technological capabilities aimed at better controlling the value chain (Hobday et 
al., 2005; Prencipe, 1997; Serfati, 2008). The distinction between state and private activities 
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that resulted from a reform of the DGA (Délégation Générale pour l’Armement – military 
procurement agency) led to the emergence of new industrial groups (Guillou et al., 2008), and 
the creation of original types of partnerships to create new assets. This situation offers 
possibilities of hitherto unauthorized interaction, based on the creation of complementary 
assets. It totally modifies the issue of IPR and their management. The way that IP is organized 
typifies this renewal, and can lead to new types of coordination being put in place. We should 
point out here that IP comprises both industrial property (which includes patents) and the 
protection of literary and artistic works. This article focuses on protection by patent, which is 
only one aspect of IP. Our empirical data characterize the new division of activities to better 
comprehend the current issues involved in organizing protection. Protection, by nature, raises 
questions of confidentiality that a priori set it at odds with outsourcing, especially in the 
highly sensitive industry of defence. Why should IP be outsourced? How should the 
outsourcing of IP activities be organized, and how should the capabilities involved in this new 
organizational arrangement be managed?  These are the questions that our research tackles. 
The answers to these questions will contribute to a better understanding of how to manage 
IPR activities. 
 
To respond to these questions our article is divided into the following sections.  In section 2, 
we present the theoretical framework, mobilizing transaction cost theory and the capabilities 
perspective. Section 3 presents the case of Thales and the evolution of the defence industry, 
which is representative of these transformations in terms of IP management. Section 4 
provides the results of our empirical findings, notably organizational changes for supervising 
IPR in Thales. Section 5 discusses the theoretical and managerial implications of this 
research. 
 
2- LITERATURE REVIEW 
Some investigations highlight how IP is organized to fit in with R&D strategy (Tsuji, 2002), 
or the growing trend for companies to manage IPR like an asset in its own right (Hanel, 
2006). Research led by Granstrand (1999) focusing on major Japanese firms takes an original 
angle by presenting several possible ways of organizing IP. Although outsourcing is presented 
as one possible alternative, this issue is neither developed nor explained. An approach 
combining transaction cost and capability theories provides a useful analytical framework for 
understanding outsourcing (McIvor, 2009). This framework is used here in the particular case 
of outsourcing IP. 
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Williamson’s work on transaction costs (1998) has been widely developed to explain the 
motivations behind outsourcing. We should briefly mention here that a company looks for a 
suitable form of organization by comparing the costs generated by a transaction with a service 
provider with the costs of integration. The level of the transaction costs is determined by three 
critical factors: the specificity of the assets, the frequency of transactions, and the uncertainty. 
An activity is thus outsourced in the following cases: 
- the service or product does not involve specific assets; 
- the transaction does not occur too frequently;  
- the uncertainty surrounding the transaction is low.  
Among these attributes, the specificity of assets plays a large role in explaining the type of 
governance (McIvor, 2009). In fact, it is the idiosyncratic character of certain assets that 
warrants carrying out activities internally. On the other hand, assets with low specificity are 
more advantageously outsourced. In this field, some authors have illustrated that strategies in 
terms of outsourcing R&D are also defined according to the specificities of innovation and 
technological assets (Huang et al., 2009). This specificity is particularly important in 
managing IPR, which involves knowledge of legal and technological aspects, and increasingly 
knowledge of strategic aspects (Ernst, 2003; Rivette and Kline, 2000). For instance, 
Herscovici (2008) shows that over the last twenty years, patents have more and more 
frequently been granted to inventors of processes. Rights may be granted, therefore, on the 
“virtual applications of a generic process” (e.g. computer algorithms). Patents are sought 
increasingly early on, making it difficult to evaluate their potential application. Granstrand 
(2000) also mentions that one of the most challenging problems in intellectual property is the 
“IP assembly problem”. This means that products and services become more “multi-
technological” (using new technologies but also combining more traditional ones). This has 
led to increasing interdependence between patents and businesses. Additional difficulty arises 
in the incorporation of the cumulative and systemic knowledge that is characteristic of 
complex industries (Hobday et al., 2000). The increased complexity of using IPR thus 
underlines the highly specific nature of IP and brings about new challenges as soon as the 
question of outsourcing arises. The study by Moeen et al. (2013) enriches this perspective. 
The objective is to analyze the portfolio of law firms (suppliers) used by client companies for 
outsourced patent legal work. The authors examine the factors that influence the concentration 
of a firm’s supply portfolio (i.e. distribution among different suppliers). Five factors are 
identified to explain the outsourcing of patent filing activities. Among these factors, a close 
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link emerges between significant firm-specific knowledge and a concentrated outsourcing of 
patent legal services into the hands of a few suppliers. 
 
As well as transaction costs, a capabilities-based approach has also been widely used in 
literature to explain outsourcing. Indeed, beyond the necessary coordination between firms, 
in-house resources and capabilities also differentiate a company from its competitors and 
constitute a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984). More precisely, 
resources are defined as assets (tangible and intangible) that are specific to the company, and 
that it creates from generic production factors available on the market (Wernerfelft, ibid). In 
this context, outsourcing concerns activities that are not deployed internally “activities in 
which the organization lacks the necessary resources or capabilities internally can be 
outsourced” (McIvor, 2009: 47). The main difficulty for the company is therefore to define its 
core business, in as much as outsourcing aims to refocus capabilities towards this core and 
delegate activities considered as peripheral (Amin and Cohendet, 2004). This is a delicate task 
since the boundary between these activities is difficult to determine. Some studies show that 
firms can end up outsourcing apparently core activities (Mehta and Peters, 2007). The same is 
true for IP management, although in this area, outsourcing is more about balancing internal 
and external activities. Since the research done by Cassiman and Veuglers (2006), this 
question has been widely investigated in the case of managing R&D activities, but not 
protection (see in particular recent studies by Hagedoorn and Wang 2012, and Berchicci, 
2013).  Concurrent with the open innovation approach (Chesbrough, 2003), the increasing 
access to external knowledge and greater openness lead to managerial governance 
implications that have been under-analyzed by open innovation scholars (Felin and Zenger, 
2013). Somaya (2012) clearly refers to “patent management capabilities” as a significant 
emerging field in literature that can help us understand how firms manage their patent choices 
and action, especially through outsourcing patent work. 
 
It follows that corporations must learn to rapidly identify which IP activities should be 
outsourced so that their division of labour and IPR-management strategy can successfully co-
evolve. Abundant examples of this type of co-evolution exist, illustrating that paying 
particular attention to IPR has allowed some companies to develop their capital and, at the 
same time, has created institutional rules encouraging their development (Murman, 2003). A 
recent investigation by Roquilly (2009) provides useful insights in this direction. Roquilly 
(ibid) shows how Apple has built up a portfolio of legal resources designed to support its 
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strategy, and how its legal capability fits in with existing rules of play. Indeed, Apple’s 
strength lies in its ability to coordinate legal resources, like IPR, with technological resources. 
Nevertheless, creating and developing legal resources also brings new kinds of paradox, since 
resources, although they bring the company legal security, are also “potential generators of 
legal insecurity” (ibid). In other words, the more IPR a company accumulates, the higher the 
risk of entering into conflict with former rights. This is all the more difficult since the legal 
environment in which firms operate is marked by patent application procedures and 
mechanisms that have encouraged the development of long and costly litigation.    
 
Ultimately, as pointed out by McIvor (2009), complementary approaches are needed to 
address the new ways of managing IPR, and in particular outsourcing. Transaction costs are 
more centred on organizational arrangements and their modes of governance. Capability 
analyses, on the other hand, start by looking at companies’ differences in performance based 
on their prior know-how and resources. Intersecting these two approaches can throw light on 
the new ways of organizing IP. Our research therefore uses both of them here, especially in 
the technological environment of complex industries. In these industries, strategically using 
and organizing IPR calls for specific capabilities to identify and negotiate different rights 
between stakeholders. This enables the development of intermediaries, such as service 
organizations specialized in managing IPR, which play an increasingly active role in this new 
knowledge market (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 1996). These intermediaries (law firms) 
negotiate rights, which are an increasingly delicate process and far removed from the initial 
technological capabilities of industrial firms. Intermediaries rarely result from spin-offs, i.e. 
from an activity developed outside the company, but are more usually the fruit of distinct and 
complementary capabilities based on a specific legal profession. That is the reason why law 
firms of this type are generally unlikely to compete with industrial firms (Moeen et al., 2013). 
There is clearly therefore a division of labour between innovation stakeholders, with 
numerous intermediaries facilitating the transfer of property rights between innovation 
stakeholders, as well as ensuring the different stages of managing these rights for their clients. 
Our research is therefore situated in a context of specialized tasks linked to innovating 
activities. In the same vein, research done by Mayer et al. (2012) strongly contributes to the 
understanding of how a firm’s different capabilities may emerge and influence the 
outsourcing decisions of patent legal work. The authors distinguish three types of human 
capital that are relevant for studying knowledge work activities: firm-specific human capital 
(knowledge and skills that are unique to a firm), industry-specific human capital (knowledge 
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about the industry setting) and occupational human capital (knowledge and skills required to 
perform work within a professional or functional area). Their results show that firms prefer to 
outsource knowledge work in highly contested areas. As such they access the potentially 
higher occupational human capital of external suppliers. They recognize the value of law 
firms’ occupational expertise, which is a major driver of outsourcing decisions for patents that 
are likely to be litigated and require the expertise of specialized suppliers.  
 
Numerous works have recently studied the new division of labour between upstream 
suppliers, who license their IPR to downstream competitors, who in turn develop these 
technologies thanks to the complementary assets they possess (Gambardella and McGahan, 
2009). Arora and Gambardella (2010) use the term Specialized Engineering Firms (SEF) to 
designate technology specialists who license their technologies to established firms. This new 
division of labour is characteristic of the Open Innovation Model, in which IPR plays a key 
role. SEFs therefore provide the opportunity to improve the creation of value (through in-
house organization and acquiring outside resources that intensify the value created) and to 
harness value (by licensing technologies to generate new revenue) (Chesbrough, 2003). This 
new division of labour has been studied in research dedicated to technological innovation 
rather than IP. Research by Reitzig and Wagner (2010) is the only contribution in this field to 
date. The authors distinguish the various activities of the IP value chain:  IP generation (R&D 
and creative works), IP protection (filing, enforcement), and IP exploitation (licensing, IP 
management). Their results show that “within the IP value chain, engaging in upstream 
patent filing increases the firm’s ability to identify competitor patents” (ibid, 1191). In doing 
so, they outline the hidden costs of outsourcing, which reduce the opportunity for detecting IP 
competitors. However, the study is mostly based on patent filing activities. This emerging 
literature does not tackle the issues of managing IPR between industrial clients and their 
suppliers, and how to organize for outsourcing. Moreover, in accordance with Lowman et al. 
(2012), this literature shows no understanding of the management of IP outsourcing processes 
and the role of legal service organizations in creating value in the outsourcing process. This is 
precisely the object of our research.   
 
3- THALES FACED WITH A NEW DIVISION OF LABOUR  
 
3.1. METHODOLOGY FOR DATA COLLECTION  
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As we have just shown, the questions that arise regarding how to organize IP and in particular 
the decision to outsource have as yet been very little developed in existing research. Despite 
fruitful analyses of outsourcing based on transaction costs and capabilities, to our knowledge 
outsourcing has never been studied with a focus on how IP is organized. From that point of 
view this research is exploratory. Its new focal point is “theory building” as defined by 
Eisenhardt (1989). As Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) indicate, this type of approach 
involves either relying on theory-driven research questions within an existing theoretical 
framework, or phenomenon-driven research questions that draw more from case work. This 
article is of the first type, with work on outsourcing being significant but not specifically 
focused on organizing IP. In this perspective, a qualitative study gives researchers an 
opportunity to grasp the context and benefits of the phenomenon studied (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, ibid). From the existing qualitative research methodologies, we chose a case study 
approach, since it allows a subtle understanding of a specific question. Case study research 
has proved particularly suited to answering why and how questions (Yin, 2003) as addressed 
in the present study: Why should we outsource IP? How should the outsourcing of IP 
activities be organized? How should capabilities involved in this new organizational 
arrangement be managed?  This research is based on a single case. According to Stake (1995), 
an in-depth study of a single case, with good access to data, gives the researcher “an 
opportunity to learn” from that particular case and understand the phenomenon studied. The 
choice of a single case can be justified when it is unusual (or rare), critical or revelatory (Yin, 
2003). Our work involved analyzing some rare and until now little-studied phenomena as well 
as responding to some particularly innovating situations. Indeed, many firms and especially 
multinational corporations operate their IPR management both in-house and externally. They 
may, for example, hire an IP consultancy firm to manage international patents, follow up on 
annual instalments or provide specialist legal advice on a specific issue. This research, 
however, looks at setting up an outsourced form of IP, since in the case studied, Thales opted 
to get rid of its Industrial Property Department altogether. This was a fundamental strategic 
choice that modified the firm’s scope of activity over the long term. Outsourcing of this kind 
might involve handing over one or more activities to another existing entity or a specially 
created entity. This amounts to a spin-off (Parhankangas and Arenius, 2003). From this point 
of view, in 2005 Thales adopted a new organizational arrangement unique in France when it 
made the decision to outsource its patents department to the consultancy firm Marks & Clerk.  
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In conducting our case study, we followed established guidelines for case study research 
(Einsenhardt, 1989; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). To this end, our research is based on 
documentary analyses and interviews held between 2004 and 2006. A number of interviews 
(17 in total) were made at Thales, including with IP managers, patent engineers and managers 
of Thales Business Units. An additional interview was held with the director of the company 
Marks & Clerk. Part of this research received funding under the contract: “Typology of 
company skills linked to defence: analysis of codified and non-codified skills” for the OED 
(Economic Observatory for Defence, Ministry of Defence, OED/DAF/Ministry), a study 
commissioned in 2004 and delivered to the OED in 2008 (Guillou et al., 2008). The defence 
industry, in which Thales plays a major role in France, is presented below, followed by a 
description of the organizational transformations that have taken place within the group.  
 
3.2. STRUCTURE OF THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY 
Defence fits in with the now common definition of an industry based on complex 
technologies (Hobday et al., 2000). Industries that incorporate cumulative knowledge and 
systemic innovations (Dosi et al., 2008), such as computing and electronics, are typical of this 
growing technological complexity in which it is increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to 
isolate the contributions made by different companies. The systemic character of innovation 
complicates the issue of managing the associated IPR, in as much as one component of a 
system can be the object of multiple patents depending on its industrial applications. In 
theory, innovation could even be blocked by the appearance of innovators who master part of 
the system and restrict its access to rival and/or complementary companies (Arora et al., 
2001). In fact, innovations based on complex technologies and products clearly exhibit the 
signs of a regime of weak appropriation such as defined by Teece (1986): cumulative 
technologies, problems relating to IP possession, and geostrategic imperatives modelling 
stakeholders’ behaviour. These industries, like defence, integrate electronic sub-sets with 
software. However, finding ways to protect these (patents and royalties) results in numerous 
problems, a good illustration of which is the different appraisals made by the American patent 
office (USPTO-United States Patent and Trademark Office) and the European office (EPO -
European Patent Office) (Hanel, 2006). In practice, players in complex industries show a 
tendency to pool patents considered as essential, which are thus made accessible to partners of 
the pool, mainly with a view to establishing standards. More generally, at European level, the 
defence industry makes comparatively fewer patent applications than all other industries.  
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In France, the defence industry has undergone numerous changes that have directly affected 
the way IPR is managed. For many years, IPR was negligible or neglected due to government 
intervention. A weak IPR culture has had a strong limiting effect on exchanges, and especially 
on spin-offs which, in the defence industry, define the transfer of military technology towards 
the civil domain, i.e. its initial application outside the frame in which it was originally 
conceived (Winebrake, 1992; Guichard, 2004). The reform of the DGA in 1997 and the 
separation of state and private activities constituted a new challenge for all stakeholders. 
Activities that came under the state were transferred to the private sector. The best-known 
example is the case of the Direction des Chantiers Navals (DCN), formerly an arsenal, that 
moved from being a state shipyard to a private firm controlled by Thales. The need to absorb 
new capabilities coming from public institutions and their increasing internationalization led 
to firms repositioning themselves (Guillou et al., 2008; Serfati, 2001) and made it necessary 
to define a new institutional framework, especially for IPR. The changes that came about in 
the 1990s redefined the rules of the game in France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States (Chinworth and Mowery, 1995), which led to a trial and error process to determine a 
framework of interactions that could be compatible with all objectives. The institutional 
arrangements put in place in Europe were at times very different, and in any case, far from 
optimal (c.f. for the United Kingdom, Mollas-Gallart and Tang, 2005).  
 
In France, in general, the private contracting party obtains the intellectual property resulting 
from the contract. Contractual relationships between public and private entities are governed 
by the French Code on public markets. Intellectual property rights for public markets are 
described by article 111 of this code, and local authority markets by article 317. In the case of 
R&D contracts entered into by the DGA with private contracting parties, these contracts are 
specifically influenced by the Cahiers des Clauses Administratives Générales (CCAG), which 
can refer to intellectual or industrial services. The main difference regarding contractual 
relationships concerns the use of the services produced, rather than their property rights. The 
CCAG relating to intellectual services can be broken down into three options, examined here 
under: 
 - Option A is the most favourable for a public entity. In this case, the public 
entity can freely use the results of a service, reproduce them and communicate them to 
a third party (without specifications in the contract), and publish them provided they 
name the contracting party. Private contracting parties cannot make commercial use of 
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them, communicate the results or publish them without the agreement of the public 
entity;  
 - Options B and C, unlike option A, assume that the public entity cannot use 
the results of services, even when partial, solely for its own purposes and those of a 
third party designated in the market. Option C differs from option B in as so far as the 
private contracting party can communicate the results of services to third parties and 
publish them under certain conditions. 
The following diagram shows the different institutional frameworks that prevail in the three 
main defence industry nations.  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 
British DEFCONs, contracts under FAR (Federal Acquisition Regulation) and contracts under 
option B provide greater incentives in terms of contractualization. They confer intellectual 
property to the private contracting party, with the public entity holding an exclusive usage 
licence. These distinctions reveal different angles of attack in the levers used to promote dual 
technologies. The United States prefers to use contractual levers that incite the most 
recalcitrant companies to collaborate with the DoD (Department of Defense), while the UK 
prefers to implement duality within its own departments. DEFCON is the British acronym for 
Defence Contractual Terms and Conditions. Note that the US acronym is used for the alert 
system used by the United States armed forces (DEFense CONditions). There are five levels 
of alert, DEFCON 1 being the highest. The highest level ever reached was DEFCON 2 during 
the Cuban missiles crisis (a document explaining DEFCONs and intellectual property with the 
MoD (British Ministry of Defence) is available at 
http://www.ams.mod.uk/content/docs/ipr/iprguide.pdf). 
 
In the French case, CRADA (Cooperative Research and Development Agreements), i.e. 
contracts made under option A, provide little incentive for industrials since the property rights 
of services lie with the public entity. For this reason, they were redefined in the mid-1990s to 
create a satisfactory IP policy at a time when companies were mutating and financialization 
was rife. It became indispensable to facilitate defence companies’ internat ionalization and 
give them the means for a genuine IP strategy. This did not, however, involve stopping 
government funding for the industry, or renouncing the principle of autonomy (for a 
discussion on this point see Oudot, 2007; Oudot and Bellais, 2008). 
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Consequently, the DGA’s clarification of IPR at the end of the 1990s in favour of private 
companies (including in numerous domains the abandonment of joint user rights on assets 
developed during initial research programmes funded by the DGA) resulted in more 
autonomy for companies. Once the DGA had limited the recourse to secrecy and the setting-
up of joint user rights with private companies, it was easier for groups to develop their 
potential internationalization and patent portfolio (for a longer discussion see Serfati 2008). 
Within the DGA, this was achieved without the systematic abandonment of IP for this 
government agency.   
 
4- EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
 
4.1. THALES’ IP STRATEGY  
Thales was created in 2000 when Thomson-CSF was split in two: Thales for defence and 
Thomson SA for the general public. Thales was therefore devised as an electronics company 
specializing in defence (50%, including air systems, land, inter-army and naval systems), 
aerospace (25%, including aeronautics and space) and security (25%, including security 
solutions and services). In February 2010, the group was organized into seven divisions 
(avionics, land defence, space, air operations defence and security systems, defence mission 
systems and transport systems). In 2005, Thales moved closer to the DCN (formerly Direction 
de la Construction Navale) by acquiring 25% of its capital with the aim of consolidating its 
position in the military naval sector in Europe and creating the basis of a “naval Airbus”. In 
2007, thanks to an agreement with Alcatel-Lucent, Thales strengthened its technological 
capacities in some key areas: systems architecture, optics and advanced software. Since then, 
the group’s objective has been to maintain its position as a global leader in electronics 
systems and defence. With a presence in 50 countries and a staff of 68,000, the group’s 
turnover was 12.7 billion euro in 2008. In 2007, Alcatel-Lucent and Thales signed an 
agreement to transfer transport, security and space activities to Thales, along with an 
industrial agreement between the two groups: creation of the company Thales Alenia Space. 
In 2009, Dassault Aviation bought Alcatel-Lucent shares and entered into the capital of 
Thales to the level of 25.90%. This led to reinforced electronic defence and defence 
telecommunications activities, but a slight move away from aeronautics defence systems. 
Thales pursues intense R&D activity to which it devotes 18% of its turnover (around two 
billion euro), employing 25,000 researchers in leading-edge domains. This strong research 
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activity is supported by numerous partnerships with universities and laboratories in Europe, 
the USA and Asia. More precisely, six technological fields form an integral part of Thales’ 
core competencies: analysis, measurement and monitoring tools, telecommunications, 
computing, optics, electric components and audiovisuals. These six technological fields 
represent around 80% of its patent-filing activity and confirm the group’s strategic position as 
an integrator of electronic defence and security systems.  
 
The group’s IP strategy aims to defend its markets, manage negotiations during disputes with 
third parties, and generate complementary revenues from development in the form of licences. 
The strategy has been somewhat modified following the changes mentioned above. The target 
of the former Thomson CSF company was to maintain its rank among the leading French 
patent filers. Since the group’s split, with the exception of the aeronautics sector, there has 
been a drop in Thales’s patent application activity. This can be explained by: the move in the 
trade towards integration systems; its specific position in a very broad range of technologies, 
which calls for a large number of electronics patent engineers who are in high demand; and 
increased staff mobility. In 2008, Thales possessed a portfolio of 13,000 patents covering 
2,700 technological fields, maintained for an average duration of seven years. Different 
divisions of Thales apply for varying amounts of patents: the most active are the aerospace, 
telecommunications and electronics (equipment and civil defence) divisions, followed by anti-
aircraft defence and naval combat systems and lastly, security and services.  
 
4.2. A NEW ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENT FOR IP ACTIVITIES 
As mentioned above, in 2005 Thales adopted a new form of organization, taking the decision 
to outsource its patents department to the consultancy firm Marks & Clerk. The motives for 
this reorganization were several:  
- The main reasons were linked to human resources. Like all major industrial groups, Thales 
was faced with a lack of patent engineers on the job market and was unable to satisfactorily 
manage IP in-house. Incentive measures (including a bonus system for inventors) were fairly 
significant, but were unable to fill this gap;  
- The company was aiming to cut costs by 20% to 25% over a period of 5 years; 
- Another reason was to explore the potential for developing external services. This entailed 
setting-up an IP consultancy firm assured by an external firm working in relation with Thales.  
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This outsourcing of Thales’ IP activity in the form of an IP firm with a financial participation 
was a first in France. The firm’s managers held 60% of the new ent ity, and the British partner 
Marks & Clerk, a leading firm in patent and brand consultancy, held 40%. It is worth pointing 
out that Thales’ IP manager at the time directly oversaw the transfer of capacities by creating 
the Marks & Clerk entity of which he has remained the manager.  
Thales’ former patents department employed 45 people. Department members moved on to 
new tasks: 32 staff joined the new Marks & Clerk entity, 6 joined Thales’ legal department, 
and 7 went to the technical department. The 32 members of staff who joined Marks & Clerk 
were for the most part patent engineers, comprising 16 engineers, 1 lawyer and administrative 
support staff. Within Thales, the seven people that joined the group’s technical department 
were put to work on the relationship between corporate policy and the technical departments 
of each of the six divisions (these are the “opinion givers”). One person is responsible for IP 
with the central laboratories (focused on initial research in several geographical zones). To 
improve links with researchers, IP correspondents (working part time) are designated to the 
80 business units that make up these six divisions. This results in the following overall 
organization (c.f. Figure 2): 
 
Insert figure 2 
 
This new organization modifies the respective responsibilities of the different protection 
activities, including the decisions to file, develop and maintain patents. Some are still 
managed by Thales, while others have been totally handed over to Marks & Clerk. Thales 
Corporate determines the group’s IP strategy. It defines the application/abandonment strategy 
and patent development in collaboration with divisional IP managers and the laboratory IP 
manager. Thales Corporate also validates abandonment propositions. Thales retains the 
property of pending patents and patents abandoned by its subsidiaries. Many of Thales’ 
overseas subsidiaries, e.g. in the UK, Netherlands and the USA, are financially autonomous 
when it comes to filing and maintaining their patents.  Overall, IP strategy can be defined as 
opportunistic: it evolves in line with the work of different divisions, with some following a 
defensive strategy, and others remaining more focused on external development. The main 
aim of this strategy is to defend market share in core capabilities relating to the six 
technological domains that are the object of the most patented applications. The IP managers 
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are in charge of linking Thales Corporate, the six divisions and the central laboratories. They 
are involved at two levels: 
- They validate divisions’ choices for patent applications; 
- They coordinate Thales Corporate and its divisions on development decisions in the 
form of licensing (or cross licence agreements) and partnerships (joint-ventures, 
alliances, collaboration contracts, fusions and acquisitions).  
 
The business units generate propositions for patent applications/renewals. Three main 
decisions are taken:  
- The first of these concerns the choice of whether to file for a patent or keep the 
invention secret. The IP correspondent initiates applications and the business unit 
manager validates decisions. The IP correspondent in each business unit plays an 
intermediary role between inventors and division IP managers. Once the decision has 
been taken to file a patent, the IP correspondent contacts Marks & Clerk so that a 
patent engineer can be designated in the firm to follow up on the evolution of R&D 
and make the legal application for the patent; 
- The second level of decision relates to the renewal policy orientated by market 
change. In this case, the IP correspondent works directly with the product line 
managers (business managers). To formalize and improve the decision-making 
process on renewals, Thales creates specific committees (with secretariats outsourced 
to Marks & Clerk) and tools to aid decision-making; 
- The last decision concerns maintaining the patents. Each business unit organizes 
portfolio reviews every two or three years depending on the number of patents. The 
final decision is taken by the patent correspondent working in the business unit and 
validated by the division’s IP manager.  
 
The consultancy firm Marks & Clerk provides operational support for Thales throughout the 
above-mentioned steps. It initially intervenes before the patent is filed, by proposing a patent 
engineer to follow up on the research, and then makes the first protection application. It is 
also responsible for writing up and following international applications. It implements Thales’ 
decision in terms of development. During this step, it plays a “licensing support” role for the 
industrial group. Lastly, the Marks & Clerk patent engineers intervene before the 
abandonment process by surveying the maintenance of patents with the IP correspondents. 
Note that during all of these steps, the business unit IP correspondents play a major interface 
 17 
 
role. For confidentiality reasons, secrete military patents are handled inside Thales. All other 
types, such as confidential patents, for which Marks & Clerk was awaiting a defence 
accreditation at the moment of its creation, are outsourced. Marks & Clerk therefore now 
provides all of the services needed for implementing Thales’ IP strategy (except for secret 
military activities, which are marginal in the group). The result is a very pragmatic approach 
to IP management: Thales has handed over all of the purely legal aspects to its new entity, and 
keeps all of the strategic and technological decisions in-house. This pragmatism allows the 
company to cut costs and redeploy the legal capacity of patent management. On its side, 
Marks & Clerk remains autonomous and offers services to other clients.  
 
5 - DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
As we have shown, Thales has introduced a significant modification in the way it organizes 
its IP in an evolving industrial context. The next step involves using these empirical data to 
answer the fundamental questions of this research: Why should IP be outsourced? How 
should outsourcing of IP activities be organized, and how should the capabilities involved in 
this new organizational arrangement be managed?  The answers to these questions can help us 
understand the decision to outsource and its theoretical and managerial implications. The aim 
is to explore the ramifications of IP outsourcing using the Thales case study and to analyze its 
implications for other firms or institutions. In other words, it involves going beyond the 
simple framework of outsourcing by showing what it can teach us about managing intellectual 
property in general. This brings us back to the question of making generalizations based on 
case studies, and in particular single case studies. Numerous works have focused on this 
question of generalization by looking at the impact that a case can make and how it can 
contribute to knowledge (Gomm et al., 2000; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). These studies outline a 
naturalistic generalization in the sense of inferring claims about a wider class of phenomena 
that go beyond a particular case (Evers and Wu, 2006). So far, case study methodology has 
provided the opportunity to improve existing knowledge by generalizing on theories rather 
than populations, which is the focus of statistical generalization.  
 
5.1. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
As mentioned above, previous research has successfully analyzed outsourcing based on 
transaction costs and capabilities. In line with the work of McIvor (2009), transaction-cost and 
capability-based approaches provide complementary analysis frameworks in the specific case 
of IPR management. However, outsourcing has never been studied with a focus on how IP is 
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organized. The benefits of this kind of research are twofold: its main contribution concerns IP 
management, along with a greater understanding of the logic of outsourcing in the case of 
spin-offs. 
 
Improving IPR studies in innovation management literature 
The main contribution of our research concerns IP management. Four main benefits are worth 
mentioning here. 
 
Firstly, our research adds to the emerging literature on IPR studies by focusing on firm level 
(Candelin-Palmqvist et al., 2012; Somaya, 2012). More precisely, it adds to the rare studies 
done on the ways of organizing protection. Apart from work by Granstrand (1999) on 
Japanese firms, research has mainly remained silent on the issue of organizing IP activity. 
Moreover, although Granstrand mentions the outsourcing of IP as a possible organizational 
design, no prior study has specifically examined IP outsourcing. Granstrand’s study centres 
on a chronological characterization of the different ways of organizing protection in-house. 
The author pinpoints six typical stages. In the first of these, a manager organizes the 
protection with occasional help from a consultant. Granstrand goes on to explain how an IP 
Department is progressively structured to support the pro-active management of IP. In the last 
stage, a “Distributed Intelligence Culture Management” takes hold, with a focus on a strong 
patent culture and shared responsibilities. In this analysis, the use of external IP consultancy 
firms is simply mentioned in passing. 
 
Secondly, our results outline a new division of knowledge and the need to develop new 
capabilities to deal with IPR. It adds to literature on identifying capabilities in the innovation 
field and especially in the IP domain (Mayer et al., 2012). Capabilities can be defined as the 
ability of a firm to manipulate is resources in order to attain fixed objectives (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993). It is important to reflect more deeply on the relationship between Thales 
and Marks & Clerk in order to better comprehend the true motives for this outsourcing and its 
consequences on the various capabilities for dealing with IPR (Parhankangas and Arenius, 
2003). As we have shown, a trigger for outsourcing was to cut costs by using a service 
provider. In line with a transaction cost approach, the Thales case clearly shows a choice 
between transaction and integration costs. As mentioned before the company was aiming to 
cut costs by 20% to 25% over a period of five years. This objective has been reached. We 
should point out here that Marks & Clerk’s fees were negotiated at the time of the initial 
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contract to make this saving possible. However, the specific nature of IP assets does not make 
it possible to rely exclusively on a transaction-based approach. Other motives therefore need 
to be considered. The increasing legal complexity that we have pointed to in complex 
industries, and defence in particular, is intrinsically linked to the decision to outsource. Given 
the numerous disputes and strategic battles around IPR, particularly in the software industry 
(Suh and Hwang, 2010), the legal competences necessary to handle competitive relationships 
may seem far removed from Thales’s prior technological core competences. In line with 
Mayer et al. (2012), Thales accesses the expertise of a specialized supplier who possesses 
occupational human capital based on patent legal knowledge. 
 
In addition, within Thales itself, IPR management has been made more difficult by the fact 
that numerous international contractual arrangements are not governed by the same protection 
traditions (this involves exchanges between foreign business units that are regulated by 
different rules of play). There are therefore both external and internal factors that call for new 
legal capabilities.  
 
Thirdly, our research underlines the complementarity of activities managed internally and 
externally. Although this complementarity has been studied for R&D activities (Hagedoorn 
and Wang, 2012; Berchicci, 2013), no research has been envisaged regarding IP. In addition, 
we show how this complementarity works in practice through organizational and strategic 
choices (Lowman et al., 2012). The outsourcing in place clearly shows that not all IP 
activities have been handed over to the service provider, but only those relating essentially to 
the legal and administrative domains. Through this new set-up, Thales attempts to minimize 
the risk of finding itself drawn into large and costly legal battles outside its initial expertise, 
while ultimately retaining decision-making power over a whole range of strategic and 
technological choices. Significantly, the fundamental decisions to file, maintain, abandon, 
renew and grant licences are always made by Thales and are taken at the highest strategic 
level. This illustrates a close relationship between IP strategy and group strategy. Thales thus 
still tightly controls its patent management. In fact, the group delegates at least part of its IP to 
an outside firm so that it can focus on its technological capabilities in integration systems 
which are considered as a primary source of competitive advantage.  
Thus, openness does not mean being totally dependent on a partner (Chesbrough and Teece, 
1996). In accordance with Berchicci (2013) this balance between internal and external 
activities enables Thales to capture the benefit of external legal competences. In this sense, 
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the decision to outsource constitutes a fundamental strategic decision based on a clear 
identification of future opportunities and the firm’s capabilities. This implies a new 
organizational arrangement for managing IPR, involving a clarification of which kind of 
activity can be outsourced as a means of preserving its core capabilities. It also outlines the 
role of service organization in creating value in the outsourcing process (Lowman et al., 
2012). From this point of view, the present case invites us to make a subtle analysis of the 
various capabilities involved in IPR management: technological, strategic and legal.  
 
Fourthly, the results add to the literature on dynamic capabilities.  From this perspective, their 
implications go beyond the simple issue of outsourcing. The study of this organizational 
approach allowed us to characterize the different types of capability currently necessary for 
managing IP. It gave us an opportunity to differentiate technological, strategic and legal 
capabilities. In particular, it showed the significance of new legal capabilities to tackle an 
increasingly complex legal environment. Our research thus underlined how important it is for 
a firm to be able to develop its resources and identify its core capabilities in a changing 
environment. Changes in the rules of play redefining the institutional environment, and the 
governance institutions in force increase this complexity but also generate an opportunity to 
create complementary legal capabilities that evolve along with the initial technological and 
strategic capabilities. In other words, our research points to a firm’s ability to effectively 
coordinate and redeploy internal and external competences and therefore develop its dynamic 
capabilities (Teece et al., 1997). Although studies of dynamic capabilities are widely present 
in the innovation field, published works have not specifically centred on analyzing these 
capabilities in the precise field of IP management. Our research makes a first contribution in 
this area. Increasingly, studies raise the issue of devising IP strategy based on the products 
and nature of innovation. Some authors even argue that the boundaries of IP should be drawn 
according to innovation’s potential modularity (Henkel and Baldwin, 2009). In this context, 
IP strategies are dynamic and co-evolve with innovative strategies. They should therefore be 
considered as a specific organizational capability that may go beyond simply creating value to 
increase the potential for profiting from innovation (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996) and to 
provide a better value appropriation.  
 
A better understanding of outsourcing in the case of spin-offs 
Along with providing insight into intellectual property management itself, our study deepens 
the understanding of outsourcing by focusing on the links between a spin-off and a parent 
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company. As mentioned by Freytag et al. (2012), establishing a new organization like a spin-
off can solve difficulties related to outsourcing. Two main contributions to previous studies 
can be outlined here. 
 
Firstly, many studies have pointed to how new organizational forms are constrained by the 
characteristics of their founders (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). However, most often, spin-offs 
occur in the same industry and either create a replica of existing routines or extend them by 
modifying the original model. To our knowledge, there have been few studies of spin-off 
development outside the parent company’s original sector, in particular industries towards 
services. The present case provides a very significant example. Here once again, a careful 
look at the specific nature of IP assets with a clear distinction, as we have shown in this case, 
between the technological and strategic dimensions on one hand and the administrative and 
legal dimensions on the other, makes it possible to explain this spin-off in a completely 
different sector. Indeed, published literature has not differentiated the various capabilities 
required to explain this kind of spin-off. Specifically, our findings outline a clear sharing of 
capabilities needed for managing IPR in complex industries, and the need to preserve a 
relationship between the new entity and the parent company to deal with this complexity. 
Maintaining these strong collaborative bonds is a way of ensuring that the capabilities needed 
for managing IPR in this type of industry are shared (Parhankangas and Arenius, 2003). Like 
the authors quoted above, we identify more quasi-outsourcing than fully-fledged outsourcing 
here. 
 
Secondly, our study confirms the importance of human capital in the success of spin-offs. It is 
worth a reminder here that the founders of the consultancy firm came from the parent 
company. The managers of Marks & Clerk personally ensure the transmission of skills, which 
minimizes transaction costs for both entities. In addition, by maintaining a network of Thales 
employees, communication is easier and the group’s technical problems can be resolved, 
minimizing transaction costs ex-post. It is in fact clear that the decision to outsource also 
involves maintaining strong links with the group, both in the actual creation of Marks & Clerk 
and the way it works. Ultimately for Thales, there is both a break and continuity, and the 
outsourcing can be seen as a redeployment of new capability within a new organizational 
entity with a strong legacy from the parent company. This naturally raises the question of 
organizational antecedents and is clearly a case of outsourcing via a spin-off, as mentioned 
earlier. Yet, when a new company is created from an existing entity, the effect is not neutral 
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on the new organization, since continuity can restrict organizational diversity through the 
transfer of competences towards a newly created entity. This is exactly the point in this case. 
On an organizational level, rather than emerging from nothing, the new entity is a 
continuation of something that already existed, creating a kind of path dependence that 
minimizes risk (Helfat and Liberman, 2002). This spin-off draws on existing human capital 
and thus minimizes the risk of failure and the development of its capabilities, since the new 
firm already possesses a set of initial capabilities (Klepper, 2001; Parhankangas and Arenius, 
2003). In addition, this new entity benefits from organizational antecedents coming from an 
international group with an established reputation for managing IP. Finally, Mark & Clerk has 
long-standing expertise, including how to deal with IP strategy in the case of systemic 
innovations. This IP capability may be redeployed in other industries, such as 
telecommunications and electronics, where negotiating IPR is rather similar but with distinct 
differences regarding the lifecycles of projects and products. Thus, strong accumulated 
experience in the defence industry opens the door to a range of opportunities in rights 
negotiations with different multinational corporations, of which the Mark & Clerk Group 
takes advantage from its locations in France and diverse countries like the UK, China and 
Australia. 
 
5.2. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Our study illustrates the direct managerial implications of managing IP. This in-depth analysis 
will be of interest to IP practitioners, as the detailed information it gives on a specific firm can 
provide a benchmark for managing IP activities. This may prove particularly useful given that 
IP practices are often considered confidential and are difficult to grasp. Most studies are based 
on secondary data (mainly patent data) but lack direct practical experience from case studies 
(Candelin-Palmqvist et al., 2012). 
The Thales case illustrates how a firm can organize its industrial protection to gain a 
competitive advantage. It underlines the importance of combining technological, strategic and 
legal capacities to determine this advantage. The outsourcing presented here is only one 
possible configuration to understand how these capabilities can be combined. Their 
combination within integrated, quasi-integrated or outsourced organizational forms is a key 
issue for managers. Whichever solution is chosen, this case highlights the importance of the 
organizational aspect of IP and the capacity of re-ordering organization to deal with an 
increasingly complex technological, and legal, context. The managerial benefits are 
particularly obvious when practising open innovation that relies on actively managing 
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property rights (Chesbrough, 2003). This open approach fosters the emergence of new 
technological markets centred precisely on exchanging rights. In these markets, the 
stakeholders are not only major groups, they are also SMEs, universities and research 
organizations (Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2008). Thus, to develop their technologies externally 
and integrate external technologies, stakeholders in these markets need to develop and 
combine new capabilities that are technological, organizational and strategic. They need to 
clearly define which of these capabilities are crucial and how they can be developed. In this 
context, the Thales case provides a good illustration.  
 
 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
To conclude, the Thales case is original in our view since it suggests that a new division of 
knowledge to manage IP is necessary and requires new technological, strategic and legal 
capabilities. This has two main implications for further research. 
Firstly, this case has outlined new forms of governance and new IPR strategies in its 
particular industry. For this reason, complex industries, like the defence industry, which have 
been significantly reorganized, provide a particularly rich observation field. More generally, 
technological complexity, such as that linked to IPR and companies’ mutations in these 
industries, raises questions about the way in which multinational corporations should (or can) 
undertake innovation and IP policy in Knowledge Intensive Sectors (KIS). Lastly, the role of 
new types of intermediation, such as the SEFs presented by Arora and Gambardella (2010) 
lead us to ask questions about new types of division of labour and governance that diminish 
the uncertainty of transactions. The intervention of Marks & Clerk clearly represents a new 
way of coordinating resources initiated by main companies and managed by new players in 
the military defence industry. It remains to be seen whether these new forms of legal 
intermediation will spread to other types of industry and other KIS.  
Secondly, our study outlines the importance of technological, strategic and legal capabilities 
and their dynamic dimension for IPR management. However, little is known about the 
effective organizational processes that play a significant role in dynamic capabilities creation. 
This effort of identification could be further developed within the field of strategic 
management with a view to opening the “black box” of these processes (Ambrosini and 
Bowman, 2009). Through identifying the details of these processes and their underlying micro 
mechanisms, a better understanding of the role of dynamic capabilities, resource creation and 
regeneration processes could emerge. 
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